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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
/

HERSCHEL BULLEN, administrator of
the estate of HEBER 0. CRONQUIST,
deceased, and wife IDELLA N.
CRONQUIST,
Plaintiffs and Appellants
vs.

UTAH STATE AGRICULTURAL
COLLEGE a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Appellant's Reply Brief

F I L E ll~E.-NELSON,
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Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in and for Cache County.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HERSCHEL BULLEN, administrator of
the estate of HEBER 0. CRONQUIST,
deceased, and wife IDELLA N.
CRONQUIST,
Plaintiffs and Appellants
vs.
UTAH STATE AGRICULTURAL
COLLEGE a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

STATEME.NT OF CASE
Respondent in its brief, fails· to discuss the pertinent
facts set forth by appellant to establish a spendthrift
trust, viz., - the plain and unmistakable language used
in the will; distributing the trust property to the trustee
to hold for 20 years, with full and complete control and
management for that period of time. Appellant points
out on page 2 of his brief that the court, following the
terms of the will distributed the greater ~of his estate
outright. Respondent at page· 1 of its brief says the san1e
thing by using figures instead of words, and adds, that
only property subject to a lease was put in trust. This
indicates that decedent wanted to preserve the leased or
trust property for the benefit of whosoever of the persons
named in the will were alive at the end of 20 years.
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And in page 2 of its brief, respondent states that various assignments of the rentals were paid by assignment,
to various persons. Heber Cronquist no doubt needed
money, had no other way of raising it, and so gave an
assignment. No doubt his dealings with his assignees
presented no dispute. It is also submitted that there is a
vast difference, legally, between assigning the income after it has accrued, than disposing of the trust estate. .But
this problem is not inv~lved here, nor .can the mere fact
that Heber made an assignn1ent of the income and paid
it, have any bearing on or change the provisions of decedent's will. After all, the interpretation of d~cedent's
\vill is in issue here. Respondent also points out that
Heber gave a mortgage to the First Security Bank. But
it will als<? be seen that this property was included as
additional security; and moreover, it further appears that
the bank required all of Heber's heirs to sign the mortgage.
(See Trans. 085). App:7ntly the bank did not regard
Heber as having any~ Interest in the property.
Respondent at page 2 of its brief says appellant retained the $4,QOO.OO, made no protest until his brother
and sister, some three years later, had sold their share for
a higher price. This is hardly the fact, and is immaterial
to .the issues involved in this case. He has consistently
offered to do equity by accounting for the $4,000.00. When
the trustee attempted to terminate the trust, Heber appeared by counsel, filed a demurrer, and the decree itself
distributes the property subject to the rights of Heber
and the respondent. (See Ex. 2, pages 223, to 240.) A
dispute had arisen between appellant and respondent, the
exact time does not appear, reg~rding the validity of the
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agreen1ent entered into. (See Transcript). Certainly
appellant could not have acted sooner. The additional
so called "facts'' respondent refers to, therefore, for the
n1ost part, adds nothing to the facts given by appellants,
but rather tends to divert attention from the real issues
presented by this appeal. The interpretation of decedent's \vill, not Heber's act in assigning the income from
the trust, is here involved.
ARGU~~IENT

AND AUTHORITES
I

Respondent at page 3 of its brief refers to Dean Griswold's work, ''Spendthrift Tn1st," page 38-270 and page
634, to the effect that the doctrine of spendthrift trust is
based on public policy, not on sound logic. · The writer
does not have access to Mr. Griswold's work, but certainly
neither 54 Am. Jur. 128, or Kelley vs. Kelley, 79 Pac. ( 2d)
1059, support any such contention. In fact 54 Am. Jur.
128, Sec. 153, says exactly the contrary. We quote:
"The validity of a spendthrift trust is grounded
fundamentally in the principle of cujus est dare, ejus
est disponere. In other words, the law recognizes a
public policy allowing a donor to condition his bounty
as suits himself as long as he violates no law in so
doing. However, the· law is not in the remotest way,
in connection with the validity of such a trust, concerned with considerations for the beneficiary. There
is no sound public policy in denying a settlor such a
right. Creditors of a beneficiary have no reason to
complain that a settlor did not give his bounty to
them." (Italics supplied).
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And the case of Kelley vs. Kelley, 79 Pac. ( 2d) 1059,
on page 1063, lays down the following rule citing cases:
. "It is of the esse!lce of a spendthrift trust that it
is not subject to voluntary alienation. by the cestui,
nor subject to involuntary alienation through attachment or other process at the suit of his creditors. # 0 0
A voluntary assignment executed before payment to
the beneficiary confers on the assignee no right to
demand payment or delivery fron1 the trustee as it
becomes due to the beneficiary."
Thus it

\v~ll

be seen that both the text and the Kelley
case indica~e that the courts lay down its rules and decisions based upon the intent of testators, - as arrived at
fro1n the language of the will. Certainly this Court is not
going to decide this case by laying down a rule of public
policy (legislate)_ which will have the effect of nullifying
decedent's' right to will his property, when his will as
made, violates no known rule pertaining to wills as provided by law. No doubt, decedent's intent will be sought
after by this court.
II
PENNSYLVANIA CASES
On page 4 of respondent's brief, counsel attempt to
show that the rule adhered to in the early Pennsylvania
case of In Re: Stambaugh, . .135 Pa. 585, has been overruled in later Pennsylvania cases. The cases of Trask vs.
Shaffer, 14 Alt. ( 2d) 211, and McCurdy vs. Bellefont
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Trust Co., 292 Pa. -!07. are cited, but a careful examination
of the facts in both of these cases distinguish the1n from
the facts in the instant case. For instance, in Trask vs.
Shaffer, supra, the '"ill placed the textatrix's property in
tn1st for and during the life of her 7 children, giving the
earned income from each share and $200.00 from the principal to each child if necessary in the judgment of the
tn1stee. Thus, the tn1stee had discretionary powers not
given to the tn1stee named in the Cronquist will. In McCurdy vs. Bellefont, supra, the testatrix created a trust for
the life of her three children, and upon their death to
certain named grandchildren. The Will also provided
that the trustee could sell the real estate with the approval of George Bush, one of the beneficiaries. Thus the
trustee as ·well as the beneficiary, could exercise discretionary powers with respect to sale of trust res. And,
moreover, the note sued upon which resulted in judgment
and attachment was signed jointly by the testatrix, Mrs·.
Bush, and beneficiary George Bush. Hence, the judment
holder was a credior of textatrix's estate. It will thus
appear that these Pennsylvania cases are clearly distinguisable on the facts from the case at bar. And naturally
the decision of the court is affected by the particular facts
invplved in the case.

ILLINOIS CASES
On page 8 of respondent's brief, counsel cite the Illinois case of O'Hare vs. Jo~ston, 113 N.E. 127, and a
federal case, Commissioner f!i Internal Revenue vs. Blair,
60 Fed. ( 2d) 340, and contends that these cases have
shown a tendencv of the Illinois courts, to restrict the rule
"
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laid down in the earlier Illinois cases cited by appellants,.
viz., Bennett vs. Bennett, 75 N.E. 339; Wagner vs. Wagner
91 N.E. 66; and Wallace vs. Foxwell, 95 N.E. 985.
It will be seen however, that when the cases cited by
counsel are carefully examined, they neither overrule nor
restrict the rule laid down in the Bennett, Wagner, and
Wallace cases. In fact, O'Hare vs. Johnston, supra, is
authority Jor appellant, and although the court stated
that there was no evidence to show that Johnston's children were spendthrifts, nevertheless, Johnston's will directs that certain of his property be placed with the Union
Trust Company, in trust, for a period of 30 years after his.
death, that the trust company shall invest the funds and
said trust company shall pay one-half of the net income
arising fron1 said trust fund, to his son William and onehalf to his daughter Hazel, and that said payments shall
be made semi-annually. At the expiration of said period
of 30 years, to pay to his said son and daughter, each
certain property (describing it) and that in the event of
the death of either William or Hazel after the testator's
death and before the expiration of said trust period·, that
their respective shares shall then be paid to the child. or
children of said son or daughter.
It will thus be seen that the Johnston will is identical
with the Cronquist will. 'The Illinois Court drew the following conclusion which is applicable to the ·Cronquist
trust:
"We think the conclusion might well be drawn
that the reason for creating this trust was based on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

the desire of the testator to keep his property in his
O\Vll decedants and prevent it from going, in the next
generation, to strangers to his blood. This trust was
certainly an appropriate method for bringing about
this result. But we are of the opinon that it is unnecessary to decide \vhether or not the tn1st created
by clause 4 is classified as a spendthrift trust, so far
as concerns the determination whether the trust estate
"·as Yested or contingent.''
The following deductions made by the Illinois Court
applies to the case at bar:
t:t:~lanifestly,

the testator intended to provide for
every contingency which he thought might arise in
regard to the death of one or both of his children,
either before or after his death, with or without issue,
and to make gifts over in anticipatio·n of such contingencies. (Italics supplied).
And the following conclusion applies to the case at
b~:

'
t:t:We have reached the conclusion that the will
provided that the gifts to the grandchildren should
vest in them at the death of their parents. This construction is plainly warranted by the language of the
will and gives effect and carries into execution the
testatols intention.'' (Italics supplied).

In the Blair case supra, the Federal Circuit Court. of
Appeals, decided a case where the facts were very similar
to the facts in the case at bar. The court reviewed the
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Illinois cases and it definitely appears that the federal
court followed the rule laid down in the Bennett, Wallace
& Wagner cases. The court also held that the will under
consideration created a spendthrift trust and that the
beneficiary could not assign his interest to the income
until after the actual receipt thereof. In the closing portion of the opinion, the court said;
"It is quite obvious to us, under the Illinois decisions to which we have referred, that the trust
created by the will in the instant case is a spendthrift
trust, and that respondent had no right to alienate it.',.
CALIFORNIA CASES
On pages 13-15, of respondent's brief, counsel have
referred to· and discussed the following California cases
cited in appellants brief, viz., Seymour vs. McAvoy, 53
Pac. 946; In Re: Blakes Estate, 108 Pac. 287; Fletcher vs.
Los Angeles Trust & Savings Bank, 187 Pac. 425; and In
Re: De .Lano's Estate, 145 P. 2d. 672. It is respectfully
submitted that the foregoing California cases support the
appellants contention that the Cronquist will creates a
spendthrift trust and the courts attention is particularly
invited to a ·review of these cases on pages 11-14 of appellant's brief.
Defandant cites the case of Kelley vs. Kelly, (Cal.),
79 Pac. 2d 1060, as authority for its contention that the
Cronquist will does not create a spendthrift trust. However, when the Kelly case is carefully read and analyzed,
it will be seen that Kelly, a stepson of the testator, took a
vested remainder in one-half of the property that had
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previously been placed in trust for the life of his mother.
l'hat case would be analogous to the Cronquist case had
Olif Cronquisfs \Yife survived him, and had he placed in
tntst the property in question for her life with the remainder over to his three children. Then had Heber during
the life of his rnother, made an assignment of an expected
interest in his property, he would have made the assignment as a devisee of Olif Cronquist, but as having a vested
interest subject only to the life tin1e of his mother, and
not as a beneficiarv tmder a trust which came into effect
after his father:J s death.
The facts in that case will also disclose that Kelley
had a vested interest in said property upon the death of
his mother, and something which he could, therefore,
definitely assign or agree to assign. Then too, it must be
remembered that enforcement of his contract could in no
way interefere with the enjoyment by his mother of the
terms of the trust. And ~e terms of the trust were fully
complied with and its objects attained upon her death and
thereafter there was nothing left to do except to distribute Kelley:Js portion of the residue of the property to him.
However, in the Cronquist trust, ther·e was no certainty that Heber would ever succeed to any property.
And moreover, by the terms of the trust, Olif Cronquist
provided that in any event Heber shall succeed to no property until after the end of twenty years, thus providing
in the meantime that he could not in any way dissipate
or alienate the trust property. Olif even went so far as to
provide against Heber's improvidence by vesting the legal
title in the property in the Cache Valley Bank, as trustee.
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If effect is now given to respondent's contention, then the
intent of Olif Cronquist to provide against Heber's improvidence will be completely destroyed, and we submit
that if Heber could destroy the effect of his father's will
on the date of the purported agreement, then it follows
that he could have likewise destroyed the effect of said
will the day after the trust went into operation.
It is significant that the California case of In Re:
De Lana's estate 145 P. 2d 672, was decided by the appellate Court of California, subsequent to the decision of Kelly vs. Kelly, supra, and it will be seen that the California
court in the De Lano estate decision definitely approves
of and follows the earlier decisions in California, Illinois,
and Kansas, herein cit~d and also cited in appellants
brief. But, the Kelly case was not even cited or referred
to in R~: De Lana's estate. Therefore, counsel and the
court in the J?e Lano estate case, supra, must not have considered the Kelly case as autho~ity. The following rules,
which we~e contended for by appellant as determinative
of the Cronquist will, are laid down by the California
court in the DeLano case, supra,_ in the following language
and citing cases:
~'It

is sufficient if the intent is reasonably plain
upon a consideration of the will as a whole. Seymour
v. McAvoy, 1898, 121 Cal. 438, 442, 53 P. 946, 41
L.R.A. 544; SanDiego Trust, etc., Bank v. Heustis,
supra, 121 Cal. App. 675, 10 P. 2d 158; Jones v. Harrison, 8 Cir., 1925, 7 F. 2d 461. It is not necessary
· that the instrument creating the trust contain all of
the restrictions and qualifications incident to spendthrift trusts. 1 Underhill on Wills, p. 695, sec. 529;
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3 Page on 'Vilis, p. 829, sec. 1308; Wagner v. Wagner,
1910, :2-l-1 Ill. 101, 91 N.E. 66, 70, 18 Ann. Cas. 490;
Bennett \·. Bennett, 1905, 217 Ill. 434, 75 N .E. 339,
S-11. 4 L.R.A., N.S., 470; Wallace v. Foxwell, 1911,
250 Ill. 616, 9t) N.E. 985, 50 L.R.A., N.S., 632; and
cases listed in Sherman v. Havens, 94 Kan. 654, 146
P. 1030, ~\nn. Cas. 1917B, page 400. The courts will
not inquire "·hether the restrictions upon the use of
the tn1st property were necessary for the protection
of the beneficiary. \Vaguer v. Wagner, supra."

On page 19 of respondent's brief, an attempt is made
to distinguish the case of Everett vs. Haskins ( Kan.) 171
Pac. 632, from the case at bar. and counsel say without
any justification therefor, that, - ""the trend of the Kansas
Court is in the same direction as the courts of Pennsylvania, Illinois, and California." There is nothing in the
case~·fittl- by respondent to justify the conclusion that
any Q:eftt exists. The following excerpt from Evertt vs.
Haskins, supra, will refute any S1.1ch conclusion:
""The trustee's control, discretion, and power of
disposition cannot be regulated or directed at the suit
of creditors. The exercise of such authority by the
courts would be in contravention of the terms of the
will. __ Why did the testator put these provisions in
his will? The answer is that he intended that William
Henry Haskins should not exercise any discretion con-.
cerning, or any control or power of disposition over,
the property that was placed in the hands of the
tn1stee." (Italics supplied.)
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And a very recent Kansas case, In Re; Watts, 162 P.
( 2d) 82, although the trustee was given power to decide
when he should terminate the trust, yet it was held that
the trustee's judgment must be upheld by the court when
the facts justified it. This indicates how far the courts
will go to uphold the solemnity of a trust.
COLORADO CASES
Counsel cite the Colorado case of Newell vs. Tubbs.,
84 P. ( 2d) 820, on page 23 of their brief. The language
creating the trust in that case had the ear marks of a vested
remainder, because it did not contain a limitation over to
the heirs at law of the beneficiaries named in the trust.
However, the Court did recognize the rule that if the will
had created a spendthrift trust, Newell's assignment would
have been invalid. The court said:
·"The only question presented is whether that
paragraph creates such a trust. If it does, N ewelts
assignment of his interest is invalid and such a holding necessarily would result in a reversal of the judment.~~ (Italics supplied).
It is interesting to contrast the case of Newell vs.
Tubbs, supra, with an earlier Colorado case of Snyder
vs. O'Conner, 81 P. ( 2d) 773, where the trust provision of
the will was very similar to that in the Cronquist will as
will be seen by the following language of the Court:
"By his will the testator provided among other
things that all but $1,000 of the residue of his property should be held in trust by his executors in
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"Fund B'' and that the incon1e therefrom should be
paid sen1i-annually to his five children, Morris, Max,
Irving, Rose and Annie, equally. In case any of the
five children die, that child:os share of the income was
to be paid to his or her issue equally, and if no issue
surrired the share tvas to be added to the shares of
the Stl'rricing children.'~ (Italics supplied.)
. .-\.nd although the will did expressly provide against
anticipation and alienation, yet the court predicated its
decision largely upon the fact that J\1ax Snyder, one of
the beneficiaries, held only a contingent remainder, and
that in case of his death before the trust period of 10
years expired, his share would go to his issue if he left
issue, otherwise his share would be added to the shares of
the surviving children. In other words, he held only a
contingent remaitlder. And in reaching the conclusion that
the assignment was void, the court said:
c:c:Until the county court orders the trust fund distributed, the property is in a real sense in custodia
legis. Moreover, it is wholly uncertain whether in
1942 Max Snyder will be among the then surviving
beneficiaries who are to share in the corpus of the
trust. We cannot allow the district court to create,
by a sort of judicial prophecy, what amounts to an
anticipated lien that may never exist." (Italics supplied).
ARKANSAS CASES
POOL vs. CROSS COUNTRY BANK, 133 S.W. (2d) 19
The above case is distinguishable from the case at
bar. It appears ftom the facts that the beneficiary had a
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vested remainder and also had a quitclaim deed from the
remaining beneficiaries who also held vested remainders.
Then too, it appears that the trustees, the brothers of the
testatrix, could exercise their discretion in determining
how long to continue the trust. The court observed:
"We get the impression, and are of the opinion
that while the testatrix sought to protect her son from
his improvidence and from misfortune, and to that
end, created what would otherwise be a spendthrift
trust, yet it was to be such only so long as the trustees,
her brothers, should in their discretion, continue it
as sueh ."
MILLER vs. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY,
180 S. W. 581.

..

.

We agree with the quotation from the above case
appearing at top of page 25 of respondent's brief. The last
clause says:
"or a clear and undoubted intention is expressed in
in the will."
It is our contention that this clause applies to the
Cronquist will.
NUN vs. FITCHE-GOETTENGER, 245 S.W. 421.
It will be seen that the above case recognizes the
doctrine that, "It is not necessary however, that the instrument
creating a spendthrift trust should contain an express
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declaration that the interest of the beneficiary shall
not be transferred, assigned, or subjected to the pay'lnent of his debts provided such appears to be· the
ciear intention of the donor 01' testator, as gathered,
fronl all the parts of the instrument construed together in the light of attending circumstances. ~ ~ ~
The trust created by the will under consideration is
of this clnss.'' . (Italics supplied).
The foregoing n1le is certainly authority for appellanfs contention that the Cronquist will creates a spendthrift tn1st.
~1ARYLAND

CASE

The case of Baker vs. Keiser, 75 Md. 332, 23 Alt. 735,
is cited by respondents on p~ge 25 of their brief. An
examination of this case discloses that Louis Keiser left
certain property in trust for and during the life of his
six children, giving each child a one-sixth share of the
income from the trust during their life and after their
death a one-sixth of the tn1st property was to be equally
divided between the children of each child. Levina Cramer, one of his married daughters and husband were
indebted upon a promissory note which was reduced to
judgment in the sum of $395.98, and an attachment was
levied against her income in the sum of $205.52 then accnled and, in the possession of the trustee. The trust
property was not attached but merely the accrued income.
The court held in effect that since the income had already
accrued and was in the possession of the t!ustee, that it
was subject to attachment by ~ creditor. It will therefore
be seen that the Keiser case is distinguishable from the
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case at bar because in that case the trust estate was not
involved and in the case at bar the income is not involved.
However, it may be strongly inferred from the decision
in that case, that had the attachment been levied against
the trust estate, the court would have held that the same
was not ·subject to attachment by a creditor because of
the fact that there was a limitation over to the children
of Levina Cramer, and therefore it constituted a spendthrift trust.
From an analysis of the above ceses, it will be seen
that they may be grouped in the following classes: Three
of them relate to discretionary trusts; and in two of them
the benficiary had a vested remainder, and in one of them
the income had accrued and was in the possession of the
trustee, and for that reason the court held the income
could be attached, so that these cases are distinguisable
from the facts in the case at bar. But in the remaining
six cases, where the facts are sin1ilar to the case bar, the
courts held that spendthrift trusts were created, hence
the latter cases are authority for appellants.
III
Counsel for respondents attempt to leave the impression that appellants' position is inequitable because
of the purported agreement entered into. -It is apparent
that any such contention must fail because appellants have
offered to make an accounting of the $4,000.00 paid. Furthermore, any such contention simply confuses or attempts
to bury the real issue in this case which is, - giving effect
to the plain language contained in the will of Olif Cronquist.
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The courts invariably follow the rule of law as given
by Scott on ,Trust Vol. 1, Sec. 152.3, wherein he says:
"Even if the assignee pays value for the assignment, the assignn1ent is ineffective as a transfer of
the beneficial interest, and the beneficiary can at any
tirne revoke it. It seen1s clear, however, that if the
beneficiary revokes the assignment, the assignee is
entitled to recover the amout which he paid for the
assignment on the ground that there is a failure of
consideration. He thereby becomes a creditor of the
beneficia-ry fo·r the amout so paid, and he can maintain an action against the beneficiary for the amount
so paid, and can reach and apply to the satisfaction of
his claim any property of the beneficiary which is
not exempt from the claims of creditors. 64 L.R.A.
1917 .A. 988." (Italics supplied).
IV
On page 13 of respondent's brief, counsel says:
"Would it not be Wisdom, in interpreting the intention of
testator, Olif Cronquist, to adopt a rule of construction
that withstands the test of time,'' and again at page 20 'in
raised type; "We vigorously contend, however, that there
is nothing in the Cronquist will from which it may be
even inferred that the testator intended to limit the power
of his beneficiaries to agree to convey their interest in the
trust estate." It is convenient here to discuss both statements together. The first statement sounds "lofty" and
does call for a desirable end, but attempts to reach this
desirable end by "interpreting the intention of testator"
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by ignoring testator~s plain words. He, testator, in his will
by. ~anguage too plain for doubt, stated the object and
purpose he desired to attain.
It certainly is the duty of the courts to determine testator's intention and sustain it if legally possible. In fact,
such is the pla~n provisions of Chapter 2, Title 101, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, and the decisions of this court. The
second statement above, if followed, would lay down a
rule of law revolutionary to the decisions of this court
hereinafter referred to. It suggests· that an inference not
contained in the will should overcome the plain language
of the will. In fact, this is the effect of all of counsel's
statements in their brief as to "public policy," and in this
connection it is believed a full and complete answer to all
of counsel's comments about "public policy" is that the
majority of the courts are against respondenfs contention
and they hold that effect be given to wills according to
testator's intention.
A review of the following Utah cases will be helpful
and beginning with the early case of In Re Campbell's
Estate, 27 Ut8ll 365, 75 Pac. 851, this court quoted with
approval the following r1:1le announced by Chief Justice
Shaw in the case of Quincey vs. Rogers, 9 Cush. 291:
"The intent of the testator is the polar star which
shall guide the court in its decision."
In a later Utah case of In Re Poppleton's Estate, 34
Utah 285, 97 Pac. 138, ·this. court in interpreting Sectio~
2767, Comp. Laws of --1907, now Section 101-2-1 U.C.A.
1943, quotes the ffrst sentence from that section which
reads. as follows:
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··.A. ''rill is to be construed according to the intention of the testator.''

A.gain the Court said:
"This intention is to be ascertained from the
language used by the testator in the will. If' the meaning is clear from the words used, a· resort to rules of
construction is neither necessary nor permissable. <~: <~: <~:
Our duty, therefore, is to ascertain this intention."
The following quotation from that case is also pertinent to the case at bar:
"The testator, ho\vever, was disposing of his own prope·rty, and he could i1npose any lawful condition upon
any bequest that to him seemed proper. (Italics supplied).
The next case is In Re Dewev's Estate, 45 Utah 98,
143 Pac. 124, where this Court laid down the following
rule of construction with respect to the intention of the
testator:
~

''It is the cardinal principle or canon of construction that the intention of the testator must prevail if
such intention, when ascertained, is not contrary to
the law and the testator has complied with the forms
of law in the execution of his will."
This Court also laid down the well known rule with
respect to the creation of a tn1st in the following language:
"One rule, which we think may be said to be of
universal application, is to the effect that no particu-
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lar words are necessary to create a trust, and that if
fronl all the language used by the testator in his will
a trust is fairly implied, the courts will enforce the
same." (Italics supplied).
In that opinion the following rule was also approved
from I Jarman on Wills (6th Ed. ) , page 355, where it is
said:
"For technical language, of course, is not necessary to create a trust. It is enough that the intention
is apparent."
In Re Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah 114, 228 Pac. 748,
this Court said:
·
"A Will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator."
"In case of uncertainty arising upon the face of a
will as to the application of any of its provisions, the
testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words
of the will, taking in view the circumstances under
which it was made exclusive of his oral declarations.'"
And in that case, the Court reaffirmed the following
rule in citing earlier Utah cases as follows:

t:t:The intention of ·the testator t:is the ultimate
object· to be kept in mind and to which all rules
must yield."'' (In Re Poppleton's Estate, 34 Utah, 285,
97 Pac. 138, 131 Am. St. Rep. 842) and c'is the polar
star which should guide the court in its decision.'~
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-(In Re Can1pbell, 27 Utah, 361,75 Pac. 851; Rumel v.
Solomon, 54 Utah, 25, 180 Pac. 419) ." (Italics supplied).
The follo,ving language is applicable to the case at
bar:

<'The foregoing principles of law are decisive of
this case, and enable us to g·ive full effect to the manifest intention of the testator." (Italics supplied).'
It would seem that the above cases· fully answer the
two statement~ quoted from the respondenfs brief and
show conclusiveiy that they can have no application to
the facts in the case at bar. \Ve also submit that no rule
of public policy should cause this court in any- way to
change the effect of its previous decisions which support
the majority rule.
In the case of Latimer vs. Holladay, (Utah) 134 Pac.
(2d) 183, cited on page 32 of respondenfs brief, the. facts
disclose that brother and sis~er (only h~irs of mother) entered into a contract to buy one another out as an expectant heir of their mother for a certain consideration. The
mother had made a will in which she provided that onehalf of her property shall go to each child, and unknown
to the daughter, thereaft~r the mother conveyed to the
son. The 'son defended on the grounds of lack of consideration.
But the facts of the above case t#'so dissimilar to
the facts in the Cronquist case, that it would certainly take
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a strained analogy to make that case worth anything,
when applied to the facts in the case at bar. The property in that case was not impressed with a trust, and the
contract was executed before the mother's death .
It is furthermore submitted that the above fully answers any difficulty which counsel imagines might confront a title exan1iner. Certainly no title examiner would
encounter any difficulty in interpreting the meaning of
the language employed in the Cronquist will. In fact, respondent had no difficulty in understanding the trust provisions of the will, because in its purported contract, a
provision was made requiring Heber and Idella Cronquist
to execute and deliver to respondent a warranty deed after
the termination of the trust. And of course, in accordance
with the recent decision of this court, fa quitclaim deed
does not convey after acquired title. See Duncan vs.
Remmel wright, et ux. (Utah) 186 P. ( 2d) 964.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Cronquist will
created a spendthrift trust for the following among other
reasons stated in appellant's brief.
(a) The legal title was vested in the trustee for the
full period of 20 years.
"
(b) That during the trust period Olif Cronquist's
children held no vested interest in· the trust property.
They held mer_ely a contingent interest.
(c) That there was a limitation over to the heirs at
law of each child.
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(d) That vesting the legal title, as well as the managenlent and control of said property in the trustee, evidenced a clear intent on the part of testator to create a
spendthrift trust.
The applellants respectfully submit to this Honorable
Court that the findings, conclusion and judgment of tbe
trial court be reversed, remanding the case and directing

that ~e trial court ente~ f~~~~f'l~c~ion, and ju~g
ment m f;~the plamtiffsaf!S p ye m the complamt,
and that
·
be awarded costs expended in the trial
court and on this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

L. E. NELSON,
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
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